Sang Yop Kang

教授

At STL, I dedicate myself to teach my students as future scientists and artists who analyze corporate governance issues with ‘warm hearts and cold brains.’ I am always happy at STL as my students develop themselves and prepare as future leaders who will accomplish 經世濟民 for their society and country.”

  • Sang Yop Kang教授是公司治理、证券法、资本市场以及公司法的经济分析领域的学者。学习法律之前,他曾任韩国大韩投资信托管理公司(现韩亚资产管理公司)的资金经理和分析员。在工作中,他通过了注册金融分析师(CFA)全部三个级别以及金融风险管理和证券市场的考试,成为了资本市场领域的专家。Kang教授在金融领域的背景推动了他的法律研究和学术发展。

    Kang教授曾在韩国延世大学攻读经济学学士学位。他因国家大学入学考试成绩优异,连续四年获得了奖学金。随后,他获得了塔夫斯大学弗来彻法律与外交学院硕士学位。此后,他任职于大韩投资信托管理公司。接着,他离开了实务领域,回到了延世大学。他获得哥伦比亚大学法学院LL.M.和J.S.D.学位。在校期间,他被提名为Fiske Harlan Stone学者以及Herman Finkelstein研究员。

    教育背景:

    • J.S.D. & LL.M., 哥伦比亚大学法学院
    • M.A., 塔夫斯大学弗来彻法律与外交学院
    • B.A., 韩国延世大学

    其他研究经历:

    • 哈佛法学院:受邀参加公司治理项目
    • 哥伦比亚法学院:访问教授
    • 哥伦比亚法学院:访问学者

    研究领域:

    • 公司法
    • 证券法
    • 公司治理
    • 公司和资本市场的法与经济
    • 金融政策
    • 公司集团
    • 机构投资者、对冲基金、另类投资
    • 法与金融、法与政治
    • 东亚和中国的经济政策及公司治理

    E-mail:

    sykang@stl.pku.edu.cn

    sang918@gmail.com

    • 商业组织法(美国公司法)
    • 全球视野下的公司治理
    • 公司法的经济分析
    • 证券监管
    • 公司与金融市场
  • Publications

    • Related Party Transactions in China, in The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions: A Comparative Analysis (University of Oxford Project), Cambridge University Press(forthcoming, 2018) (single-authored)
    • “Game of Thrones”: Children’s Competition and Corporate Governance Issues in Family-Controlled Corporations, Berkeley Business Law Journal (forthcoming, 2017) (single-authored)
    • The Independent Director System in China: Weaknesses, Dilemmas, and Potential Silver Linings, Tsinghua China Law Review (2017) (single-authored)
    • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups, Virginia Law & Business Review (2016) (single-authored)
    • Tension Between Shareholder Primacy and (Quasi) Monopoly: A Theoretical Analysis of Controlling Shareholder Economies and China, University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review(2015) (single-authored)
    • “Generous Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements in Bad-LawJurisdictions, Stanford Journal of Law, Business &Finance (2015) (single-authored)
    • Taking Voting Leverage and Anti-Director Rights More Seriously: A Critical Analysis of the Law and Finance Theory, Columbia Journal of Asian Law(2015) (single-authored)
    • Competition Law Meets Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure, Voting Leverage, and Investor Protection of Large Family Corporate Groups in Korea, Peking University Transnational Law Review(2014) (co-authored with Nansulhun Choi)
    • Re-envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Often Embrace Each Other, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law(2014) (single-authored)
    • Transplanting a Poison Pill in Controlling Shareholder Regimes: Why It Is So Difficult, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (2013) (single-authored)

    Other Publications

    • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups,Oxford Business Law Blog (based on the invitation from University of Oxford, the summary of an article with the same title—which was published by The Virginia Law & Business Review in 2016—was posted on the blog)

    Presentations

    • Board Composition and Independent Directors in Korea, University of Leeds (forthcoming, January 2018)
    • Issuing New Shares, Convertible Bonds and Corporate Governance, Tsinghua University (清华大学) School of Law International Conference (forthcoming, October 2017)
    • Related Party Transactions in China, Goethe University (forthcoming, October 2017)
    • Related Party Transactions in China, University of Oxford (May 2017)
    • “King Lear Problems”: Succession and Corporate Governance Issues in Family Corporations, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Faculty Seminar) (March 2017)
    • King Lear Problems”: Corporate Governance Issues of Succession in Family Corporations, University of California, Berkeley, International Conference entitled “Comparative Corporate Governance” (February 2017)
    • Internal Transactions and Fairness, Korea Economic Research Institute (January 2017)
    • “King Lear Problems”: Corporate Governance Issues During the Succession in Family Corporations, Peking University PHBS Business School (Faculty Seminar) (December 2016)
    • “King Lear Problems”: Corporate Governance Issues During the Succession in Family Corporations, Tsinghua University (清华大学)School of Law (Public Lecture) (December 2016)
    • “King Lear Problems”: Corporate Governance Issues During the Succession in Family Corporations, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Public Lecture) (December 2016)
    • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups, Renmin University (人民大学) School of Law (Public Lecture) (November 2016)
    • Hostile Takeovers and Defenses: Lessons from Korea for China, Tsinghua University (清华大学) School of Law International Conference (October 2016)
    • Reconsidering the Independent Director System in China: A Silver Lining Amidst Weaknesses?, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Faculty Seminar) (October 2016)
    • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups, Peking University PHBS Business School Seminar (July 2016)
    • King Lear Problem: Succession Crisis in Family-Controlled Corporations, Asian Law and Economics Association Conference (June 2016)
    • Cumulative Voting, Corporate Groups, and Institutional Investors, AsianLaw Institute Conference (May 2016)
    • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Faculty Seminar) (May 2016)
    • Dilemmas of the Independent Director System in China, Tsinghua University (清华大学) School of Law International Conference (November 2015)
    • Market Dominant Corporation, Shareholder Wealth, and Welfare of a Nation: Analysis in Controlling Shareholder Economies and China, Korea Law and Economics Association Conference (June 2015)
    • Market Dominant Corporation, Shareholder Wealth, and Welfare of a Nation: Analysis in Controlling Shareholder Economies and China, Peking University School of Law (Faculty Seminar) (June 2015)
    • Refining Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises: Lessons from China, Korea, Japan, and the ICSID Convention (with Mark Feldman), Peking University School of Law (Faculty Seminar) (May 2015)
    • Tension Between (Quasi) Monopoly and Shareholder Value Maximization, Korea Securities Law Association (February 2015)
    • The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate from Minority Shareholders, Shin & Kim (August 2014)
    • Re-envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, and Implications, Korean Securities Law Association (July 2014)
    • Law and Economics Analysis on (Unfair) Self-Dealing in Chaebols: Problems, Reforms, and Evaluation, University of Tokyo Law Faculty (May 2013)
    • Nonlegal Mechanisms for Constraining Controlling Shareholders: Analysis of“Roving” and “Stationary” Controllers, Peking University School of Transnational Law (Faculty Seminar) (March 2013)
    • Controlling Shareholders: “Roving” v. “Stationary”,Seoul National University Law Research Institute, International Conference “Recent Trends in Research on Corporate Law” (September 2012)
    • Efficiency Market Hypothesis, Behavioral Finance, and the Securities Regulation, Korea Law and Economics Association (August 2012)
    • S. Takeover Doctrines and Their Implications, Korea Securities Law Association (July 2012)
    • Evaluating Macro-level Corporate Governance Index, Peking University School of Transnational Law (May 2012)
    • Re-envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other?, Peking University School of Transnational Law (March 2011)

    Other Activities in Journals and Conferences

    • Invited as a commentator in a conference organized by National University of Singapore (NUS) and Singapore Management University (SMU) (Forthcoming, January 2018).
    • Invited as a participant in the discussion group at the conference of “German and East Asian Perspectives on Corporate and Capital Market Law” organized by Seoul National University and Max Planck Institute (March 2017)
    • Invited as a commentator at Renmin University (人民大学) School of Law in the Symposium, “the Development of Legal Journals in English in China”(December 2016)
    • Invited as a reviewer at Renmin University (人民大学) School of Lawin the conference organized by two journals, the Frontiers of Law in China and the Journal of Contemporary China (May 2016)
    • Worked as a reviewer of a manuscript submitted to the Asian Journal of Comparative Law (Cambridge Journal) (November/December 2015)

    External Teaching/Lecture

    • Teaching the course, Corporate Groups and Internal Transactions, in the Perl River Delta Academy of International Trade and Investment Law (PRAIA)Program (forthcoming, November 2017)
    • Teaching the course, Understanding Corporate Groups in Asia: Transnational Law and Economics Perspective, in the Perl River Delta Academy of International Trade and Investment Law (PRAIA)Program (July 2016)

    Work-in-Progress

    • Cumulative Voting, Corporate Groups, and Institutional Investors(First Draft)
    • Understanding State-Owned Enterprises(First Draft)
    • Takeover Defense Mechanisms in Korea (First Draft)
    • Takeover in China: Vanke Case and Its Implications
    • Corporate Governance Issues Around Convertible Bonds
    • Board Composition and Independent Directors in Korea
    • Corporate Groups and Controlling Family Shareholders: Critiques of the Traditional View
    • Does Hedge Fund Activism Improve the Quality of Corporate Governance?
    • It Might Be Better to Live with Devils That We Know: Why Fundamental Reforms on the Controlling Shareholder System Would Fail
    • Efficient Market Hypothesis, Behavioral Finance,and Securities Regulation in Developing Economies
  • 我院 Sang Yop Kang教授受邀在英国牛津做演讲

    我院Sang Yop Kang教授应邀出访哈佛法学院和加州大学伯克利法学院

    Sang Yop Kang副教授受邀参加英文法学期刊发展研讨会

    我院Sang Yop Kang教授受邀参加清华大学和人民大学讲座

    Professor Kang Speaks at 21st Century Commercial Law Forum

学院通讯

北京大学国际法学院

深圳市南山区西丽大学城
北京大学深圳研究生院国际法学院410
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