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Nitzan Shilon

Professor of Law

“When it comes to monitoring people who manage other people’s money or other resources, agency theory highlights one simple fact: that nothing – not (i) state-of-the-art markets, financial incentives, and corporate governance mechanisms; nor (ii) comprehensive regulation and effective monitoring by governmental agencies; nor (iii) relentless and ruthless media and public sentiment – can perfectly substitute for simple human integrity.”

    • Business Associations

    • Corporate Finance

    • Corporate Governance Seminar

    • Securities Regulation


    • Nitzan Shilon and Yueh-Ping Yang, ESG in the US vs. China: Contrasting Concepts, Applications, and Enforcement Mechanisms (working paper).

    • Nitzan Shilon and Shlomi Shuv, Regulation by Market Emulation: Reforming Shareholder Distribution Rules (working paper).

    • Gili Bartura and Nitzan Shilon, What Should Matter for Investor Protection: Legal Rules vs. Market Standards (working paper).

    • Nitzan Shilon, The Stock Buybacks that Enrich Corporate Executives and Create Systemic Risk (working paper).

      o Featured in the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets.

    • Nitzan Shilon, Markets vs. Regulation: Investor Protection in the U.S. Compared to Israel, in: Cambridge Handbook on Investor Protection (Arthur Laby ed., 2021), (Cambridge University Press).

      o Featured in the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets.

    • Nitzan Shilon, Stock Buyback Ability to Enhance CEO Compensation: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 303 (2021).

    • Nitzan Shilon, AGENDA (a Financial Times’ boardroom resource), The Pay Incentives that Failed Boeing’s CEO, (Feb. 3, 2020).

    • Nitzan Shilon, Replacing Executive Equity Compensation: The Case for Cash for Long-Term Performance, 43(1) DEL. J. COR. L. 1 (2018).

    • Nitzan Shilon, Putting Directors’ Money Where Their Mouths Are: A New Approach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 511 (2017).

      o Featured in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.

      o Discussed in: James Saft, Boards Should Put Money Where Their Mouths Are in Hostile Offers, REUTERS (Sep. 14, 2016).

    • Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies – Rhetoric and Reality, 90 (1) IND. L.J. 353 (2015).

      o Featured in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.

      o Discussed in: Quentin Fottrell, Ten Things CEOs Won’t Tell You, WALL. ST. J. MARKET WATCH (May 12, 2014).

      o Discussed in: Pradnya Joshi, Golden Parachutes Are Still Very Much in Style, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013).

    • Jesse M. Fried and Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 722 (2011).

    • Nitzan Shilon, The Lack of Age Diversity in S&P 500 Firms: Causes, Consequences, and Potential Remedies (preliminary draft).


    • Annual Conference of the Canadian Law and Economics Association (September 2012, September 2013, May 2015, September 2016, September 2017, September 2019, October 2022).

    • Annual Conference of the European Law and Economics Association (September 2012, September 2014, September 2016, September 2020, September 2021).

    • Annual Conference of the German Law and Economics Association (July 2021).

    • Annual Conference of the Israeli Private Law Association (June 2021).

    • The Wharton Financial Regulation Conference (April 2021).

    • Annual Conference of the American Law and Economics Association (May 2015; August 2020 (via digital distribution)).

    • Annual Conference of the National Business Law Scholars (June 2018, June 2020, June 2021).

    • Tel Aviv University (Law and Economics Workshop, March 2020).

    • Freie Universitat Berlin (January 2020).

    • Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association (June 2015, June 2018, June 2021).

    • Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe (May 2018).

    • Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (June 2012, June 2016).

    • Annual Conference of the Asian Law and Economics Association (June 2014).

    • Harvard Law School (Faculty Workshop, November 2013).


    • Bank Hapoalim Executives Should Not Get a Windfall – They Must Return Their Bonuses, Op-Ed, The Marker (a Hebrew-language daily business newspaper published by the Haaretz group in Israel)(November 22, 2022).

    • Special Litigation Committees, Interview with Liel Kyzer, Reshet Bet (a major radio station in Israel)(February 14, 2022).

    • Bank Executives Should Return the Bonuses They Received for Criminal Activity, Interview with Efrat Neuman, The Marker (February 13, 2022).

    • Executive Compensation and Stock Buybacks, Interview with Jeff Mahoney, The Council of Institutional Investors’ Podcast “The Voice of Corporate Governance” (May 6, 2021).

    • Annual Conference of Israel’s Institutional Investors (September 2016; October 2020).

    • Harvard Law School (Law and Economics Seminar, April 2012; Current Issues in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance Seminar, May 2010).

    • LL.M. and S.J.D., Harvard Law School

    • B.A. and M.A., Tel-Aviv University School of Economics

    • LL.B., Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law

  • Professor Nitzan Shilon Releases New Research on Stock Buybacks as an Executive Compensation Problem

    Professor Nitzan Shilon Publishes an Op-Ed in Agenda

    Professor Shilon’s Research Featured in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

    Professor Shilon Interviewed in Financial Times Publication about CEO Stock Ownership Policies

    Professor Nitzan Shilon undertakes prestigious appointment as Commissioner of Israel Securities Authority

    Professor Nitzan Shilon’s research featured in Reuters

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